Why, when asking oneself whether to believe that p, must one immediately recognize that this question is settled by, and only by, answering the question whether p is true? Truth is not an optional end for first-personal doxastic deliberation, providing an instrumental or extrinsic reason that an agent may take or leave at will. Otherwise there would be an inferential step between discovering the truth with respect to p and determining whether to believe that p, involving a bridge premise that (...) it is good (in whichever sense of good one likes, moral, prudential, aesthetic, allthings-considered, etc.) to believe the truth with respect to p. But there is no such gap between the two questions within the first-personal deliberative perspective; the question whether to believe that p seems to collapse into the question whether p is true. (shrink)

When we deliberate whether to believe some proposition, we feel immediately compelled to look for evidence of its truth. Philosophers have labelled this feature of doxastic deliberation 'transparency'. I argue that resolving the disagreement in the ethics of belief between evidentialists and pragmatists turns on the correct explanation of transparency. My hypothesis is that it reflects a conceptual truth about belief: a belief that p is correct if and only if p. This normative truth entails that only evidence can be (...) a reason for belief. Although evidentialism does not follow directly from the mere psychological truth that we cannot believe for non-evidential reasons, it does follow directly from the normative conceptual truth about belief which explains why we cannot do so. (shrink)

Why, when asking oneself whether to believe that p, must one immediately recognize that this question is settled by, and only by, answering the question whether p is true? Truth is not an optional end for first-personal doxastic deliberation, providing an instrumental or extrinsic reason that an agent may take or leave at will. Otherwise there would be an inferential step between discovering the truth with respect to p and determining whether to believe that p, involving a bridge premise that (...) it is good to believe the truth with respect to p. But there is no such gap between the two questions within the first-personal deliberative perspective; the question whether to believe that p seems to collapse into the question whether p is true. (shrink)

Believing that p, assuming that p, and imagining that p involve regarding p as true—or, as we shall call it, accepting p. What distinguishes belief from the other modes of acceptance? We claim that conceiving of an attitude as a belief, rather than an assumption or an instance of imagining, entails conceiving of it as an acceptance that is regulated for truth, while also applying to it the standard of being correct if and only if it is true. We argue (...) that the second half of this claim, according to which the concept of belief includes a standard of correctness, is required to explain the fact that the deliberative question whether to believe that p is transparent to the question whether p. This argument raises various questions. Is there such a thing as deliberating whether to believe? Is the transparency of the deliberative question whether to believe that p the same as the transparency of the factual question whether I do believe that p? We will begin by answering these questions and then turn to a series of possible objections to our argument. (shrink)

Why can't deliberation conclude in an intention except by considering whether to perform the intended action? I argue that the answer to this question entails that reasons for intention are determined by reasons for action. Understanding this feature of practical deliberation thus allows us to solve the toxin puzzle.

The COVID-19 pandemic has shaken the world. After liberalization in 1991, microfinance became a panacea for poor people without collateral and information asymmetry. The higher cost of microfinance and debt traps highlighted the need for the state to intervene in resource redistribution. In addition, national lockdowns and COVID-19 restrictions have made it difficult for emerging economies like India to achieve this sustainable development goal. The Reserve Bank of India introduced self-help group (SHG) bank linkage to ensure the financial inclusion of (...) the poor. The difference-in-difference method examined how SHGs affect entrepreneur households’ income. CMIE Consumer Pyramid dx data were used for analysis. The data establish that SHGs have increased the income of the households, and demographic factors such as education, income level and gender also impact the financial inclusion of the poor. (shrink)

The theme ‘East versus west’ is an old topic for discussion, but one that is constantly being rehashed. Though it has many aspects, a number of elements remain vague. Do East and West each form a monolithic bloc? Where does the East begin in the West's eyes, and vice versa, the West for the East? What, if any, are the basic differences separating the two?Palaeontologists tell us that a dividing line indicating a divergence of traditions in stone tools can be (...) traced back to the Lower Palaeolithic era, that is, a million years ago, in the western region of India. To the east of that line, in other words in East and South-east Asia, the most common tools are choppers and chopping-tools, while to the west, in western Asia, Europe and Africa, the main tools are hand-axes. The former are suitable for working vegetable materials and making bamboo or wooden, therefore perishable, objects, which for this reason leave no trace in the form of archaeological clues. The hand-axes are capable of being worked into stylized shapes and are appropriate for dismembering large herbivores and cutting up their meat. (shrink)

Mark Schroeder has recently presented apparent counterexamples to the standard account of the distinction between the right and the wrong kinds of reasons. We argue that these examples appear to refute the standard account only because they blur the distinction between two kinds of reasoning: reasoning about whether to intend or believe that p and reasoning about whether to take up the question of whether to intend or believe that p.

It is common for philosophers to claim that doxastic voluntarism, the view that an agent can form beliefs voluntarily, is false, and therefore that agents do not have the kind of control over their beliefs required for a straightforward application of deontological concepts such as obligation or duty in the domain of epistemology. The role that the denial of doxastic voluntarism plays in an argument to the effect that agents do not have obligations with respect to belief is simply this.

Two prejudices have hampered our understanding of John Stuart Mill’s central argument for free speech. One prejudice is that arguments for free speech can only be made in terms of values or rights. This prejudice causes us to miss the depth of Mill’s argument. He does not argue that silencing speech is harmful or violates rights, but instead that silencing speech is a uniquely self-undermining act; it undermines the ground upon which it is based. But even if we overcome this (...) prejudice and appreciate the self-undermining character of Mill’s argument, the prejudice that epistemic justification is a completable task blinds us to the role of open-mindedness in his argument; and failing to see this leads us to wrongly conclude that his argument is invalid. It is only once we have overcome both prejudices that we can appreciate the depth and power of Mill’s argument for free speech. (shrink)

As Descartes famously pointed out in theSecond Meditation,the thought that someone is thinking is true anytime anyone thinks it. Furthermore, thinking it makes it true. Conversely, anytime anyone thinks that it is not the case that someone is thinking, this thought is false, and thinking it makes it false.l will argue that the propositions ‘There is at least one true normative proposition’ and ‘There are no true normative propositions’ have very similar properties. The proposition ‘There is at least one true (...) normative proposition,’ like the proposition ‘Someone is thinking,’ is true anytime anyone believes it, and, in an important sense, it is made true by someone's believing it. Conversely, anytime anyone believes that there are no true normative propositions, the proposition he believes is false and his believing it makes it false. (shrink)

George, feeling stressed and anxious about the criminal investigation into his firm’s accounting practices, decides that it would do him good to get away and take a long, relaxing vacation in Bermuda. According to popular informed-desire accounts of a person’s good, if George would desire to take a vacation to Bermuda upon being made fully aware of what his experience of the vacation would be like and of all the consequences therein, then this course of action would benefit him. This (...) does not mean that George must actually be privy to whether his fully informed self would desire to travel to Bermuda, but whether he would, according to such an account, determines whether going to Bermuda would benefit George, whether he or anyone else is capable of knowing it. (shrink)

Taylor and Francis Ltd TSEP_A_151217.sgm..

科学の発展は我々の暮らしを豊かにし、人類が解決しえなかった多くの問題を解決してきた。しかしそれは同時に、科学では解決できない新たな問題を生み出す歴史でもあった。著者はその最たるものとして原子力をあげ、 望ましい科学のあり方について思索を進めていく。本書は、戦争を否定し平和を希求する科学者の集まり、パグウォッシュ会議の開催に触発されて書かれたもの。だが、会議の姿勢は評価しつつも、科学の発展そのものが文 明や人類を破壊しうるという認識が科学者の側には足らないと厳しく指摘する。二十世紀を代表する批評家が最後の力を振りしぼって遺した警世の書。.

George, feeling stressed and anxious about the criminal investigation into his firm’s accounting practices, decides that it would do him good to get away and take a long, relaxing vacation in Bermuda. According to popular informed-desire accounts of a person’s good, if George would desire to take a vacation to Bermuda upon being made fully aware of what his experience of the vacation would be like and of all the consequences therein, then this course of action would benefit him. This (...) does not mean that George must actually be privy to whether his fully informed self would desire to travel to Bermuda, but whether he would, according to such an account, determines whether going to Bermuda would benefit George, whether he or anyone else is capable of knowing it. (shrink)

Contemporary Kantianism is often regarded as both a position within normative ethics and as an alternative to metaethical moral realism. We argue that it is not clear how contemporary Kantianism can distinguish itself from moral realism. There are many Kantian positions. For reasons of space we focus on the position of one of the most prominent, contemporary Kantians, Christine Korsgaard. Our claim is that she fails to show either that Kantianism is different or that it is better than realism. Our (...) strategy is to argue that what are supposed to be claims that conflict with realism in fact do not. (shrink)

三島教授は、60年代末から70年代はじめの社会的思想的な激動期を挾んで、長年、法思想史・法哲学の研究と教育に携わって、わが国の法哲学界において思想的支柱を担う一人として活躍してこられた。カントをはじめ とするドイツ観念論の法思想、プラトンを中心とする古代ギリシャ法思想、現代自然法論の法思想などに関する一連の研究は、わが国の法思想史研究の画期をなすものであるのみならず、その背後にあって導いている「人間 存在の根源」への真摯な問は、教授の研究に接する者に絶えざる再考を促している。教授の退官を記念して、論集を編むこととなったのは、教授が研究してこられた学問分野と、教授の研究の背後にあるものへのあらたな関 心をよぶ機会としたいと願うからである。.

The paper offers a philosophical reflection upon the film Ghajini which was directed by Ajith Rahul Murugadoss in 2008. The film is an Indian remake/translation/transcreation of Christopher Nolan’s Memento (2000). Through Ghajini, I attempt to explore the reversible migration between spaces such as forgetfulness and memory, moment and sequence, inwardness (or consciousness) and externality (or the world). The paper creates an intercultural dialogue about self-identity and the materials of which it is made, a theme touched upon and developed in both (...) movies, Ghajini and Memento, each in their own way. Special attention is given to the activity of translation, with its possibilities and impossibilities, as the breeding-ground of every dialogic encounter. In my philosophical collage I draw on classical texts such as Patañjali’s Yogasūtra as well as modern interpretations such as Luce Irigaray’s Entre Orient et Occident. (shrink)

The present study examines cases of the Japanese copula da used in the utterance-final position in naturally occurring conversations. The morpheme da in Japanese is typically categorized as a type of copula in linguistic studies, but da also functions as an utterance-final expression, especially in the spoken form of Japanese. The examined recordings of naturally occurring conversations for the present study contained 120 cases of utterance-final da, and 89 of them were uttered immediately following statements of subjective evaluation. In addition, (...) of these 89 cases of utterance-final da that followed statements of evaluation, 87 were determined to follow statements in which the speaker expressed his or her negative attitude toward the evaluated matter. The data analysis also showed that 26 cases of utterance-final da in the examined recordings were uttered immediately after the speaker discovered a new piece of information. Based on the findings from the data analysis, the present study argues that utterance-final da is considered to be one of the expressions in Japanese that can signal both discovery of new information and the speaker’s negative attitude toward a stated matter. In addition, the present study also argues that da marks the speaker’s emotional exclamatory reaction when it is used in the utterance-final position. (shrink)